- OPG aims for Red Sea security
- Houthi threats target ships
- Concerns over political escalation
Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), a coalition of the willing led by the United States Navy and designed to ensure the secure passage of international shipping through the Red Sea, is scheduled to come into effect in the coming days. The operation, which involved Canada, Australia, and allies from Europe and the Middle East, has been rejected by three significant NATO members: France, Italy, and Spain.
What is the precise function of OPG?
The official statement, “to ensure the commercial ships’ safe passage,” is excessively imprecise to be entrusted to a naval flag officer. Politicians should delegate to admirals the precise objectives and unambiguous directives required to accomplish the intended outcomes.
Merchant ships en route to and from the Suez Canal have been targeted by antiship missiles and drones of diverse configurations laden with explosive payloads. At this time, the threat appears to be straightforward to define. Ansar Allah, also referred to as the Houthi group, fired upon everyone from Yemen. The Houthi now control the majority of the country, including the most extensive stretch of its 450-kilometer-long Red Sea coastline. Each surface-launched missile was equipped with payloads capable of causing damage to large cargo ships but little chance of sinking.
Initially stipulating that they would target vessels owned by the Houthis that were engaged in trade with Israel, their scope was subsequently broadened to encompass all vessels utilising Israeli facilities. Given the string of assaults in which the Israeli involvement appeared to be minimal or ambiguous. It is judicious to presume that any vessel could be the target.
Sophisticated shipborne surface-to-air missiles (SAM) have thus far destroyed every missile neutralised by US and French warships, proving that modern vertical-launch systems guided by phased array radars of the most recent iteration function as intended. Numerous nations designated to engage in OPG possess vessels possessing comparable capabilities. Modern surface-to-surface missiles, which can strike targets on land or sea, are carried by nearly all.
Challenges of Convoy Protection
Should the objective of OPG be strictly limited to averting collisions with commercial vessels. It might be feasible to accomplish this by employing the time-honored method of convoy navigation under the protection of warships.
Slow, defenceless commercial cargoes sail in convoys in precisely defined columns at varying distances from one another. They are led, flanked, and pursued by swift warships capable of confronting any threat. It worked for Malta, the UK, and Russia, among other nations saved by convoys during World War II.
However, every approach has its limitations. A convoy is long and difficult, spanning miles to keep large vessels apart and allow them to move. Despite safeguards, cargo ships and tankers over 300 metres (984 ft) long constitute a concern. In general, commercial vessel captains lack convoy operations training. The majority of them have no prior experience operating in large groups or under military command.
Despite being heavily armed, their escorts are equipped with a restricted quantity of missiles and must strategically plan their deployment to prevent additional assaults along the shipping lane and ultimately deplete a war reserve for the ship’s defence. After depleting a portion of the missiles, restocking them becomes necessary. This is faster and safer in a friendly port out of Houthi missile range than at sea.
Navigating Houthi Threats
In order to traverse the crucial 250 nautical miles (463 km) along the Yemeni coast that leads to or from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, ships would be exposed to Houthi missiles and drones with the shortest range for a minimum of 16 hours at an assumed 15 knots (28kmph) (convoys always sail at the speed of the slowest units).
Furthermore, prior to endeavoring to execute the run, these vessels would be especially susceptible. This vulnerability occurs in the staging areas situated in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Where they would accumulate, organize the convoy, and commence operations.
The Houthi missile threat is presently recognised as significant, accompanied by a considerable arsenal. The capability of naval planners to execute concentrated protracted assaults simultaneously from multiple directions must cause concern.
This was demonstrated on October 19, during the Houthi’s inaugural assault, which targeted the USS Carney, a destroyer still operational in the Red Sea and a member of OPG, with fifteen drones and four cruise missiles. The nine-hour-long assault, which was likely orchestrated to evaluate the Houthi attack doctrine and the adversary’s reaction, required the crew of the target vessel to sustain optimal readiness and concentration in order to intercept all incoming missiles.
Each admiral would apprise his political superiors that military exigency would require assaults on the Houthi missile infrastructure situated on Yemeni soil, including storage and production facilities, mobile and stationary launch sites, command centres, and the scant radar infrastructure that remains. An anticipatory reaction to the missile menace involves the elimination of the Houthi ship-targeting capability. This is in contrast to a reactive approach confined to intercepting incoming missiles.
Military Objectives, Political Risks, and Regional Dynamics
Theoretically, offensive operations against the Houthi missile infrastructure might be executed via armed drones deployed from remote land bases and missiles launched from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, in addition to reconnaissance by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, realistically speaking, the only way to achieve significant success in the region would be to employ combat aircraft. Specifically, bombers based on the two nuclear-capable US Navy vessels are considered essential.
Targeted assaults in Yemen would be unequivocally justified from a military standpoint. However, they would also entail a conspicuous political peril: the Arab and Islamic world perceiving the West, and the United States in particular, as siding with Israel in the Gaza conflict. After all, the Houthis say their Red Sea attacks are meant to persuade Israel to stop the war.
Recognising the dangers associated with a development that could easily escalate the conflict, the United States has endeavoured to proceed with caution by engaging with regional powers and communicating its desire for non-escalation. It even openly and unsuccessfully demanded that its ally Israel terminate the conflict immediately and minimise civilian suffering.
Currently, both the White House and the Pentagon are trampled on hot embers. If nothing is done, the Red Sea route would unexpectedly stop, hurting the US, Europe, and Asia economies. Failure to ensure safe passage with the interim measures presently put forth will result in a loss of credibility. These measures only escort convoys without striking land-based missile systems and risk economic recession.
Even if the US must attack, it will have contributed to a possible containable escalation of danger.
Aware of these predicaments, France, Italy, and Spain have decided to “protect the ships of their respective nations.” They do so by “unilaterally” deploying their frigates to the Red Sea. If the United States Navy were to ultimately launch an assault on Yemen, the Europeans would be able to assert that they were not involved in the escalation of the conflict, thereby shifting the onus to the United States.
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