Manchester Arena attack: Security services may have prevented bombing, inquiry says

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By Creative Media News

According to the inquiry’s third and final report on the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, “there was a realistic possibility that actionable intelligence could have been obtained that might have led to actions preventing the attack.”

According to the inquiry’s chairman, the security services were responsible for “a significant missed opportunity to take action that could have prevented” the Manchester Arena bombing.

In the third and final report of his investigation, former high court judge Sir John Saunders examined whether MI5 and counter-terror police could have prevented bomber Salman Abedi from carrying out the attack.

Manchester Arena attack: Security services may have prevented bombing, inquiry says

The investigation revealed that Abedi, who was born in Manchester, had been on the security services’ radar for seven years before the bombing.

On May 22, 2017, after an Ariana Grande concert, Abedi detonated a suicide bomber, killing 22 people and injuring hundreds more.

The report also covered Abedi’s radicalization and the planning and preparation for the attack.

However, many of the victims’ families have focused on the failures of the security services to prevent the attack.

Sir John stated in his report:

It is impossible to determine whether the attack could have been prevented based on the balance of probabilities or any other evidentiary standard.

“However, there was a realistic chance that actionable intelligence could have been gathered. Which could have led to actions that would have prevented the attack.”

He claimed that a Security Service agent’s inability to act quickly contributed to the missed opportunity.

“Demoralizing conclusion”

According to him, the investigation also revealed issues with information sharing between the Security Service and counter-terrorism police.

“It remains extremely difficult to determine whether different or additional measures taken by the authorities could have prevented the attack. It could have happened or it could not have happened.”

Families of the victims described the report’s conclusion as “devastating.”

They stated in a statement: “Reading today’s report was both excruciatingly painful and eye-opening. On the question of the preventability of this attack, the report provides inevitably less information than we would have desired. But it is now abundantly clear that crucial intelligence about Salman Abedi was not properly evaluated, that it was not properly contextualized, and – most tragically – that action was not taken promptly.

“At the very least, a realistic chance of preventing this attack was lost as a result of these failures. This is a devastating conclusion for us. The shortcomings highlighted in this report are unacceptable.”

They continued, ” “Salman Abedi should have been reported to Prevent, it is obvious (counter-terror program). The educational system must be more vigilant in identifying indicators of radicalization. The Didsbury mosque turned a blind eye to extremism in its midst. Today’s report by Sir John contains numerous lessons; we must immediately implement all of them and make the necessary changes.

“On May 22, 2017, thousands of people left their homes to attend a concert at Manchester Arena. 22 of those would never return home. Those killed and injured in this heinous attack had every right to feel safe and protected. But as this investigation has shown, they failed on every level – before, during, and after this heinous attack.”

“Intelligence was not shared”

During the 17-month investigation, several MI5 and police counter-terrorism detective witnesses testified behind closed doors. To protect national security, the meetings were held in secret.

A summary of some of their evidence was later made public but the so-called “gist” did not reveal any details about the intelligence received by MI5 in the months before the attack.

But Sir John’s report identified the “principal missed opportunity” as two pieces of intelligence received by the Security Service in the months preceding the attack, “the significance of which was not fully appreciated at the time.”

Both of these intelligence items, which were not disclosed in the report, were determined to pertain to “non-malicious or non-terrorist criminal activity” on the part of Abedi.

The Security Service (MI5) did not share either piece of intelligence with anti-terror police in the northwest. Sir John stated that if additional investigative steps had been taken as a result of one of those pieces of intelligence, “this would have increased the overall prospect that the attack would have been prevented.”

The other critical piece of intelligence, Sir John said, “gave rise to the real possibility of obtaining information that might have led to actions which prevented the attack. We cannot know what would have happened. But there is at least the material possibility that opportunities to intervene were missed”.

When Abedi returned to the United Kingdom from Libya four days before the attack, he said, this information could have led police to follow his Nissan Micra, which contained the explosives.

Sir John stated that when the second piece of intelligence was received. The Security Service officer should have reviewed it and written their report that day, but they didn’t.

“Due to the report’s delay, a major investigation was lost. I am convinced that such an investigational action would have been proportional and warranted. This ought to have occurred,” he said.

Sir John said the security agency and police “underestimated the risk” of Libyan returnees because they focused on Syrians.

Radicalization of Abedi

The investigation revealed additional missed opportunities to intercept Abedi.

The Security Service received information about him for the first time in December 2010, he was treated as a “subject of interest” in 2015, and he had contact with convicted terrorist and “known radicalizer” Abdalraouf Abdallah.

Counterterror police did not provide the security service with any communications between Abedi and Abdalraouf Abdallah. Sir John stated that they should have been, as it would have provided more information about Abedi’s “actions and intentions.”

On May 31, 2017, nine days after the bombing, a meeting to discuss Abedi’s investigation was planned.

Sir John stated in his report that father Ramadan, mother Samia, and older brother Ismail Abedi bore “significant responsibility” for Salman Abedi and his younger brother Hashem’s radicalization. Hashem Abedi is serving a minimum of 55 years in prison for his role in the attack’s planning.

Sir John stated, “Salman Abedi’s radicalization journey into operational violent Islamist extremism was primarily motivated by noxious absences and malevolent presences.”

“Parental absence and extended disengagement from mainstream English education were examples of noxious absences. The ongoing conflict in Libya and association with a radicalizing peer group were malign influences.”

“Missed opportunities”

Sir John’s initial inquiry report, released in June 2021, centered on security arrangements on the night of the bombing and highlighted a series of “missed opportunities” to intercept Abedi before he detonated his device.

His second report, published in November last year, was highly critical of the emergency service response. He determined that one of the victims, John Atkinson, would have likely survived if the inadequate response had not occurred. There was a “remote possibility” that the youngest victim, eight-year-old Saffie-Rose Roussos, could have survived.

Sir John stated in his concluding report, “Abedi “left no message explaining why he committed the attack. The evidence I heard does not provide a definitive answer as to why he did what he did “.

He added: “I regret that I have not been able to reveal everything I have discovered in my open report. I am aware that my revelations while expanding public knowledge, will raise additional questions.”

Sir John made several recommendations in his final report.

Since the beginning of 2017, dozens of so-called “late-stage attack plots” have been foiled, he said.

Having said that, if the Security Service or counterterrorism police make errors. They must be identified and steps are taken to rectify them.

Suella Braverman, the home secretary, stated that she is “committed” to collaborating with MI5 and the police to “do everything possible” to prevent a repeat of the “horrifying” attack.

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