Despite the tentative ceasefire and lull in combat in Sudan, few believe this to be the end of the conflict, and it is uncertain how the next few weeks and months will play out.
A rapid military triumph
This seems improbable given that both sides enjoy advantages during distinct phases of conflict.
A military junta has splintered in two, with both rival factions claiming early victories.
According to the accounts of those leaving the capital, Khartoum, the RSF appears to have a minor advantage in the city.
It is a mobile guerrilla force that can adapt faster than its more conventional adversaries. This capability has benefited them in the city center conflicts in Khartoum.
The army, however, is believed to have vastly superior ordnance, be it tanks, artillery, or air superiority.
As diplomats and foreigners leave the city, it is anticipated that Khartoum will soon be targeted.
Alan Boswell of the International Crisis Group (ICG) explains, “In large portions of the city, the RSF is swarming residential areas with fighters who have occupied homes.”
They are daring the military to destroy its metropolis. One might assume that [the army] does not wish to annihilate Khartoum, but for them, this is an existential struggle.”
According to independent Sudan analyst Jonas Horner, both factions can seek assistance from external allies, which could prolong the fighting.
The army is believed to have the complete support of regional powerhouse Egypt, although the northern neighbor has officially maintained its neutrality.
Meanwhile, the RSF is supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia’s Wagner mercenary organization, and other regional militias.
An extended conflict
This conflict could develop in a variety of negative ways for the people of Sudan.
Islamist supporters of Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party have been active.
In 2019, the army expelled Bashir from power following widespread street protests. During his thirty-year reign, numerous ethnic militias were heavily armed.
“Bashir worked diligently to create these divisions between these various ethnic groups, which led to the formation of militias,” explains Mr. Horner.
“Because they’ve had to manage their security, militias have reopened as a result of the security vacuum created by his removal.”
Mr. Horner believes that if the militias took sides, this conflict could become even more dangerous, which would make it “much more difficult to put it back in its box.”
Many observers are gravely concerned about the potential racial element. Both generals have also attempted to use this to their advantage.
Hashim states, “Before the war began, both Hemedti and General Burhan stoked ethnic tensions while addressing their respective constituencies.”
“We could see a scenario in which the RSF, having recruited in marginalized regions of the country, attempts to present itself as a unifying force in rural areas,” says Ahmed Soliman of the Chatham House think tank.
This could result in the RSF moving to Darfur’s heartland in an attempt to resupply and mobilize more combatants.
A peace agreement
Diplomats are attempting to convince the two generals to consent to an extension of the ceasefire, but no one is optimistic that peace talks will commence soon.
There is also the matter of what the average Sudanese would find acceptable.
Hashim was in Khartoum throughout the 2019 revolution and witnessed the generals repeatedly fail to give over power to civilians, culminating in the 2021 coup.
After a year and a half since the coup, they have failed to govern the country. What kind of agreement could these two individuals reach that the Sudanese would find acceptable? He inquires.
Everyone seems to concur that only external pressure will result in a deal.
Mr. Boswell says it is difficult to envision a complete cessation of hostilities without significant leverage, political pressure, and economic pressure from regional allies such as Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
The issue is that there are too many competing, often mutually exclusive, interests.
Mr. Horner believes that “regional powers favor a military or powerful individual to emerge victorious in this situation. This is a negative development for civil society.”
However, there is concern that if peace negotiations do not commence soon, as is proposed in neighboring South Sudan, the conflict could fragment, making it more difficult to resolve.
“There is still time for settlement negotiations. The difficulty is that neither side is inclined to de-escalate the situation. And regrettably, the diplomatic focus in the short term remains on engaging with what the two generals want, at the expense of civilian democratic ambitions, according to Mr. Soliman of Chatham House.
The problem is that what both individuals want directly contradicts not only each other but also the desires of the Sudanese people.
This conflict is about power, control, and wealth, and both parties view it as increasingly existential.
Sudanese citizens will pay a heavy price for the ambitions of two individuals.
