- Israeli attack shocks Middle East
- Prominent Hamas leaders assassinated
- Questions on motives, potential escalation
Tuesday’s assassination of senior Hamas officials in Beirut, Lebanon, suspected to be an Israeli attack, sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East. Hundreds of individuals have been killed daily for the past three months, but the most recent targeted killing has caused widespread concern, rekindling old grievances and inciting apprehensions regarding a potential escalation of the conflict.
Prominent Hamas leaders were among those affected by the assault. Saleh al-Arouri, a former commander of the Qassam Brigades and a member of Hamas’ political bureau, emerged as the most notable figure. He oversaw the organization’s political and military endeavors beyond the confines of the Gaza Strip, where it amassed financial and political backing. Al-Arouri, a native of the West Bank, was reportedly one of the most well-liked Hamas leaders in Fatah-controlled regions of Palestine before October 7. It is possible that his notoriety increased since then.
Samir Findi and Azzam al-Aqraa, both senior military commanders, were among those who perished, in addition to four other operatives.
The assassination displayed every characteristic of classic Israeli long-range targeted eliminations of valuable human targets. Al-Arouri and his associates perished in an attack that specifically targeted a second-floor apartment situated on a street surrounded by eight-story buildings on both sides. The incident bore notable parallels to the demise of Ahmad Yassin, a spiritual leader and co-founder of Hamas, which transpired in a Gaza street and was targeted by an antitank guided missile modification.
Evolution of Israeli Tactics
As technology and the times evolve, so too do Israeli capabilities. A range of 1.2 miles (2.0 kilometers) was sufficient for an armored antitank AH-64 Apache helicopter to eliminate Sheikh Yassin in 2004. Contemporary advancements in missile technology and more compact, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) accomplish the identical objective. The undetected combination utilized in Beirut seems to have been an Israeli-made system consisting of a Hermes drone and a Nimrod missile.
Additionally, the assault elicited resentful recollections of prior military incursions and activities in Beirut executed by Israel without consequence. Fifty years have passed since one of the most infamous covert murders occurred in April 1973, when an Israeli commando unit landed on a beach in Beirut and executed three of the most senior Palestinian leaders. Future Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was a member of the crew; he was attired and makeup-applied to resemble a young blonde woman. In a chilling parallel to the murder that occurred on Tuesday, Kamal Adwan, the military commander of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the West Bank, was the primary target.
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Years later, Israel benefited from the operation codenamed Spring of Youth, which precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Saeb Salam of Lebanon and sparked armed confrontations between pro-Palestinian factions and their adversaries, as well as a general deterioration of the political and security climate in the country. After two years of escalating mistrust, unfulfilled commitments, false allegiances, and internal strife, Lebanon entered a violent and protracted civil war that lasted until 1990. Israel pursued its objectives through internecine conflict, which it financed, armed proxies, and supported and instigated atrocities such as the ones that occurred in Sabra and Shatila in 1982.
Unraveling Motives and Timing
Although the historical instances are unsettling, history does not invariably recur, particularly for those who acquire knowledge from the past.
An analyst begins by posing the following inquiries: “Why him? Why now?,” “What will occur next?”
Despite the fact that “why him” is essentially irrelevant, it remains an essential inquiry. Israel aims to eradicate a significant number of senior Hamas officials, a goal it is likely to pursue with heightened determination subsequent to October 7. Reportedly independent-minded, Al-Arouri was a very high-ranking Hamas official who was both capable and influential, in contrast to the rest of the organization’s senior leadership.
He amassed his international network and contacts while residing long in Turkey and Lebanon, away from Palestine. Israel, renowned for its exceptional intelligence, must have possessed knowledge of his capabilities and potentially his undisclosed intentions. In the event that al-Arouri met his demise for any political motive, it is highly probable that his frequent and intimate physical interactions with Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, as well as the multitude of Iranian political and military representatives stationed in south Beirut, played a role. As a dependable companion, he likely interacted with them on a daily basis. He will be difficult for Hamas to replace immediately in that capacity.
“Why now?” is likely the most important inquiry. Without a doubt, Israel promptly became cognizant of his 2015 arrival in Beirut, following years of constant relocation; while all Hamas leaders adhere to stringent security protocols, those were undoubtedly more lackadaisical before October 7, and an assassination attempt on him earlier would have been ample opportunity.
Strategic Shifts and Political Calculations
Both Hezbollah and its patron and protector, Iran, have demonstrated exceptional political patience and restraint by delaying an assault on Israel subsequent to the latter’s bombardment and subsequent assault on Gaza. Israel’s initial assessment had to account for the potential establishment of a second front by Hezbollah. However, following nearly three months of relative calm in the northern region, Israeli forces demobilised five brigades, evidently certain that any future combat would take place within the strip.
However, numerous influential Israeli politicians, generals, and politicians have cautioned that Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, and the generals do not share the same perspective. Instead, he might perceive the ongoing conflict as something that directly benefits him.
“The Netanyahu government is opposed to the conclusion of this conflict.” “In the days following the conclusion of the war, Netanyahu will face a significant political challenge as investigations into Israeli failures will commence,” Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator, cautioned a few days ago.
Political Maneuvering and Future Uncertainty
If you are apprehensive about the war’s conclusion, why not prolong it? Why not establish an additional front in the north, increase the number of American soldiers and sailors in uniform, maintain the nation’s war footing, and prevent legislators and citizens from posing unwelcome inquiries? Why not capitalise on the opportunity to foster an environment where far-right politicians, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, are more likely to maintain their extremist stances, such as advocating for the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza and the resettlement of Israelis in their place? Saul Netanyahu’s behaviour would be consistent with the aforementioned, according to seasoned observers of the Israeli prime minister.
The current pivotal inquiry is whether Hezbollah will succumb to the self-evident offer. It has been alleged that on Wednesday, a high-ranking Iranian delegation, which reportedly consisted of several senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps generals, arrived in Beirut. Evidently, the speech that Nasrallah had originally scheduled for Thursday was cancelled. Instead, he issued a pre-recorded address on Wednesday, wherein he reiterated his customary admonitions to Hezbollah’s adversaries but refrained from disclosing any specific resolutions. Almost undoubtedly, he is currently consulting with his Iranian allies regarding Hezbollah’s eventual response to the killings in Beirut.
Such meetings may provide the response to the question “What will occur next?”
